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Abstract: Sustainability transitions are of an inherently political nature. In particular, discussions on
climate policy are dominated by national and international politics. Furthermore, sustainability
transitions involve network governance in which both private, public, and societal actors are
involved. These governance processes call for closely scrutinizing their performance in terms
of democratic legitimacy. To study and assess the democratic quality of governance processes
regarding climate policy, this article focuses on the role of political leadership, conceptualized
as political meta-governance, in enhancing the democratic legitimacy in the field of sustainability
transitions. In doing so, it examines the case of the Dutch National Agreement on Climate (“Nationaal
Klimaatakkoord”). The findings of this study underline the theoretical assumption that governments
seek to use network governance to address climate change and develop policies. Seeking to address
the application of political meta-governance, this study finds that political leaders struggle to bring
about a fully-fledged, deliberative, and integrative meta-governance approach. However, disparate
meta-governance strategies are reported. Although democratic legitimacy concerning the Dutch
Agreement on Climate in terms of accountability can be regarded as high, values concerning voice
(inclusiveness) and due deliberation (transparency) score comparatively low. As such, this study
further justifies the close attention governance scholars and practitioners pay to the democratic values
at stake when governing through governance networks.
Keywords: meta-governance; sustainability transitions; interactive governance; network governance;
democratic legitimacy; climate; climate governance; accountability; political leadership
1. Introduction
As has been heralded with several national and international agreements concerning climate
change, a global momentum appears to have come about to further accelerate the transition
towards more sustainable societies. Generally, it is acknowledged that sustainability transitions,
being socio-technical processes of transformative change, demand the close collaboration between
interdependent actors that interact in order to make decisions [1–5]. Sustainability transitions thus
provide a particular instance in which new modes of societal steering are likely to emerge [5,6].
The presence of hybrid forms of interactive decision-making and network governance, in which several
actors interact and exchange ideas, is widely recognized, and even considered a core characteristic
of sustainability transitions [7]. Although exact definitions may differ among scholars [8], related
modes of governance indeed assume the emergence of networks or arrangements of interdependent
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societal, private and/or public entities that operate autonomously, surround a policy problem or
(public) service, and interact in order to exchange resources and make decisions together [9–13].
These patterns of interaction give rise to an arrangement of actors concerned with a particular
problem or service, which engages in a governance process based on interaction [12,14,15]. This
constellation of operational autonomous, but interdependent actors is often referred to as a “governance
network” [10].
Despite the relatively autonomous character of the operations of these networks, “sustainability
transitions are inherently of a political nature, simultaneously reflecting, reinforcing and transforming
existing institutional and governance arrangements, ( . . . ) relationships between different actors and
the unequal distribution of power within and among social groups and interests” [16]. Although
government thus is not the sole actor, but rather an agent of one of the many involved interests, its
role in sustainability transitions remains significant. Hendriks, here, argues that conventional and
emergent forms of governance “co-exist” [17]. Although it is acknowledged that a multi-stakeholder
governance approach is favorable, governmental actors retain to have a strong position in organizing
and eventually steering these processes of interactive governance [18–21]. Christopoulos et al. [1]
offer an example of a role for state-level actors in coordinating governance activities concerning
Energy Efficiency policies (EE). In a similar vein, Head [22] calls for pluralistic, multi-stakeholder
approaches orchestrated by government regarding effective climate adaptation measures in Australia.
Avelino et al. [23] warn that the remaining importance of politics may cause novelties and innovations
to be “captured” by vested interests. Thus, whether positive or potentially negative, power and politics
in sustainability transitions are ambiguous and, indeed, continue to call for close examination [24].
Therefore, sustainability transitions take place in a governance network context [17]. A persistent
dilemma underlying the emergence of governance networks is their potential lack of legitimacy,
because the primacy of politics might get challenged, and decisions are taken based on horizontal
relations and mutual accountability [25–27]. In this situation no-one can feel accountability, which in
turn hampers the democratic legitimacy of (political) decision-making. We still know little about how
legitimacy is safeguarded in governance processes, which is particularly ambiguous in sustainability
transitions [28,29]. Consequently, how democratic legitimacy in governance networks in sustainability
transitions is safeguarded is an important normative and empirical question [30].
In this article, we set out to further examine the question of democratic legitimacy in governance
networks in the context of sustainability transitions. We pay special attention to the role of
political leaders in the “meta-governance” of public affairs in an example of network governance in
sustainability transitions. Consequently, this article proceeds with exploring the relationship between
political leadership in a context of network governance concerned with sustainability transitions and
the democratic performance thereof. First, the dilemma underlying democratic legitimacy in network
governance is further examined. Second, political leadership in sustainability transitions is further
operationalized and understood as political meta-governance. Third, these theoretical conceptions
are applied on a case of a state-centered process of network governance in a sustainability transition
context: the Dutch National Agreement on Climate (“Nationaal Klimaatakkoord”).
2. Governing Sustainability Transitions and the Issue of Democratic Legitimacy
Whereas traditional top-down decision-making assumed a predictable and relatively stable
environment for decision-making to take place, the development of interactive governance processes
that can be found in sustainability transitions is highly uncertain, causing complex decision-making
processes [6,31]. Therefore, severe attention has been paid to attempts to manage and steer these
processes, and keep track of their performance [10,32].
With the particular aim of facilitating transitions towards sustainability, a wide variety of
specific transition-related modes of governance emerged [5,7]. In governing sustainability transitions,
different modes of governance are elaborated in order to bring these transitions about. Some call for
deliberate meta-governance strategies [33,34], others call for institutionalized, overarching governance
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frameworks [1,35,36] and others herald transition management as key to bring sustainability transitions
about [4,7,23,37].
Although these scholars acknowledge that transitions cannot be “managed” in a traditional way,
they can be influenced and possibly accelerated with the correct application of particular governance
activities [37]. These concerns, among others, meta-governance and network governance, multi-level
governance, the multi-phase concept, strategic niche management and transition management [4,7].
Despite this variety, many of these modes of governance show similarities. As Loorbach finds,
common elements concern “actor–network interaction, different levels, different social domains with specific
characteristics, plurality of actor perspectives, and new instruments, practices, and approaches that emerge
within the field of steering and government” [5]. The variety of empirical and theoretical conceptions
concerned with sustainability clearly illustrates the urgency to find modes of governance that effectively
facilitate them.
Specific dilemmas and barriers underlying the governance of sustainability transitions have
been extensively debated. As illustrated, a persistent dilemma that comes with the emergence of
interactive network governance is that, due to their constellation of public, private, and societal
actors that “co-govern”, network governance is no longer primarily focused on political realms of
public sector government. Indeed, this holds important implications for their public legitimacy
and accountability [13,21,27,38,39]. As Jhagroe correctly observes, “clearly, a main challenge in the
context of transition management, are inherent tensions underlying existing democratic institutions and
procedures.” [28]. In addition, Van Buuren and Loorbach [40] have indicated that transition arenas are
often becoming disconnected from official (political) decision-making and may therefore be lacking
democratic legitimacy.
With regard to his examination of socio-technical transitions in the energy system, Meadowcroft
notes that transition management supporters are often criticized for “being overly optimistic about
the possibilities of displacing the existing regime, and for neglecting the political and power dimensions of
transitions” [29] He puts forward that, in order to maintain democratically legitimate, transition
management practice may be expected to “throw questions back into the political arena”, since it is
concerned with political choices, making it “hard to see how these could be made by anyone except a
political authority.” [29]. Hence, existing governmental institutions based on political representation
retain to play an important role in organizing and steering sustainability transitions. To further
enhance our understanding of the democratic implications of emergent modes of governance in
sustainability transitions, we henceforward regard transition management as a particular mode of
network governance [17].
One of the lenses through which the interrelatedness of existing political reality and the
logic underlying network governance and sustainability transitions can be further understood,
is meta-governance. Our focus on democratic values further calls for a broader emphasis on political
legitimization, which is where transition management falls short. Meta-governance, on the other
hand, explicitly addresses democratic legitimacy in a governance network context. Hence, this
article will precede with conceptualizing the issue of democratic legitimacy in network governance,
and the potential reconciliation between existing political institutions and network logic in the form
of meta-governance.
2.1. Assessing Democratic Legitimacy in Network Governance
As illustrated above it is, on the one hand, widely agreed that governance in sustainability
transitions relies strongly on the involvement of stakeholders, partnerships and “joint” governance
efforts, which can be regarded as modes of network governance [9,41,42]. We particularly witness
the emergence of network governance in sustainability transitions, as these tend to show a strong
actor–network evolution [5,6,23,43]. It is argued that effective and legitimized governance requires the
negotiated interaction between state and non-state actors [29,32,34].
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On the other hand it is questionable whether interactive modes of governance contribute to
enhanced legitimacy of the way governance is enacted [41,44,45]. Whereas state capacity “hinges
upon its democratic authority and legitimacy”, lent by elected officials, the rise of network governance
as such has been argued to lead to a “bypass of the nation state”, and therefore, the marginalization
of state authority [46]. As Papadopoulos observes, “this policy style tends to replace the influence of the
‘demos’ (exerted through the designation of elected representatives) with a combination of group representation
and influence tied to sectoral or local expertise” [47]. The question whether network governance threads
or complements existing institutionalized forms of democratic legitimacy and state authority, thus,
sparked an extensive scholarly debate [27,30]. How the democratic legitimacy of governance networks
can be assessed, thus, is an important normative and empirical question.
In their elaboration of different models of democratic legitimacy in governance networks, Klijn
and Edelenbos [48], and later Klijn and Koppenjan [10] arrive at three main sources of legitimacy that
are a returning feature in different models of democracy. First, the way accountability is organized
is an important, if not the most important source for democratic legitimacy [10,25]. Accountability,
here, refers to the formal accountability of identifiable officeholders and procedures to hold them
accountable [49]. Second, voice is core to the democratic legitimacy of network governance processes.
This refers to the possibilities of citizens and actors to actively participate in decision-making processes,
and the procedure of decision-making itself. As Papadopoulos puts it, “considerations of transparency,
equal access and such like are likely to prevail in the assessment of decisional procedures” [45]. Elements such
as fairness and accessibility can thus be considered elements of voice [10,45]. Third, due deliberation
strongly refers to the quality of the interactive governance process and the process through which
information and arguments are exchanged [10,30,48].
Thus, sources of democratic legitimacy in interactive governance arrangements can be
found threefold; in accountability, in voice and in due deliberation. Sørensen, in studying the
institutionalization of interactive governance, arrives at similar core features, although formulated
slightly different: democratic inclusion, democratic deliberation and democratic accountability [26].
2.2. Assessing the Role of Political Leadership in Sustainability Transitions
Sustainability transitions are of inherently political nature. According to Meadowcroft, “Precisely
because politics plays a potentially powerful role (defining the landscape, propping up or destabilizing
regimes, protecting or exposing niches), it requires explicit attention from those interested in
understanding sustainability transitions” [50]. When one is to further examine the notion of political
leadership, one quickly finds that political leadership is transforming thoroughly [38,51–53].
Indeed, there is a wide consensus that governmental steering through merely top-down
decision-making or markets does not suffice when addressing sustainability transitions [5,9,22,50,54].
Network-based modes of governance rely on the involvement of public, private and societal actors,
and accordingly change the role of political leadership [9,11,30]. Consequently, the traditional role
of elected officials as “sovereign rulers”, based on the primacy of politics, morphs into the role of a
“meta-governor” that distantly influences complex arrays of interacting actors by applying particular
strategies [38,48,53]. The emergence of network governance thus demands a fundamental reappraisal
of what it means to be a political leader. However, bringing about lasting political role innovation is
difficult. In empirical analysis, Edelenbos et al. examine the rural development of the “Broekpolder”
in the Netherlands, and find that political role innovation, providing more space for self-organization
to take place, may come about, but is difficult to maintain [51]. Koppenjan et al. find that politicians on
local levels of government take on a meta-governor role, concerning the restructuring of agricultural
sites in the Netherlands [52].
One of the theoretical lenses through which political leadership in a polity in which power
and resources are widely dispersed can be understood, thus, is meta-governance. Meta-governance
was originally defined as “the organization of the conditions for governance in its broadest sense” [20].
Conceptualizing meta-governance as a way through which existing political institutions are able to
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steer governance networks, it may be generally regarded as the “regulation of self-regulation” [44,55].
“Danish-school” governance scholars such as Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing further elaborated the
concept as “a reflexive and responsive process through which a range of legitimate and resourceful actors aim to
combine, facilitate, shape and direct particular forms of governance in accordance with specific rules, procedures
and standards.” [8,44].
They propose meta-governance as an instrument which “enables politicians and public managers
to exercise state power in a decentered polity in which power is dispersed within complex networks
bringing together public and private actors from different levels and policy areas.” [44]. Emphasizing
the importance of the legitimacy issue, Carey Doberstein, in his examination of meta-governance in
Canada, regards meta-governance as a notion that “captures the relationship and tension between
the willingness of the state to engage with civil society representatives ( . . . ) via purpose-focused
governance networks, while maintaining some degree of control over their activity consistent with
traditional notions of democratic accountability” [25]. As Christopoulos et al. conclude in their study
on sustainable development (SD) in Croatia, Nepal and Mongolia, national governments are “keen to
take up programs for SD” and meta-govern by developing rules for engagement, thereby fostering
deliberation among affected stakeholders [56]. Daugbjerg and Fawcett underline these findings by
showing the strong role of Danish government in meta-governing cases of organic farming, and in
doing so strengthening its democratic performance [57].
Regardless of the subtle differences in theoretical conceptualizations of meta-governance,
its manifestation in practice appears to be a topic of a wider consensus. According to Bell
and Hindmoor, the core functions of meta-governance are aimed at steering, effectiveness,
mobilizing resources and ensuring fair, democratic and legitimate functioning of the network [18,25].
Complementing this conceptualization, Sørensen and Torfing emphasize the importance of framing
and storytelling by governmental actors; that is, influencing the discourse surrounding the
network [38,44]. In elaborating different strategies that may be used in order to enact meta-governance,
Sørensen and Torfing provide a fourfold categorization, and distinguish “hands-off” and “hands-on”
meta-governance (see Table 1).
Table 1. Hands-off and hands-on meta-governance strategies as identified by Sørensen & Torfing.
Distance to Interactive Governance Arrangement Meta-Governance Strategy
Distant influencing: Hands-off meta-governance
Network design: influencing through e.g., scope,
character, composition, procedures
Network framing: influencing through e.g., political
goals, legal basis, storylines
Direct interference: Hands-on meta-governance
Network management: providing material and
immaterial inputs to empower actors, resolve conflict,
reduce tensions etc.
Network participation: influencing e.g., the policy
agenda, decision-making, negotiated outputs etc.
Network design, here, concerns attempts aimed at influencing the scope of the governance network,
its composition in terms of participants, and the design of internal procedures and processes. Network
framing concerns influencing the “political goals, fiscal conditions, legal basis and the discursive storyline” of
the governance network. Both can be considered “hands-off” as they are deployed distanced from the
governance network itself, and concern activities that surround the network rather than interfere in its
operations [38,44,58].
“Hands-on” strategies, on the other hand, show direct interference within the operations of the
governance network. These strategies fall apart in two main categories: network management and
network participation. The first concerns attempts to “manage” the development of the network, such as
reducing tensions among its members, empowering particular actors and lowering transaction costs
by providing certain inputs. Here, an overlap with the “Dutch school” of network management can be
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witnessed [10]. The latter, network participation, concerns the meta-governor becoming one among
many network participants, while retaining a “reflexive gaze” in order to influence its operations [44].
Both hands-off and hands-on meta-governance strategies can be considered complementary,
reinforcing one another when deployed deliberately [38,44]. However, Torfing et al. put forward
that politicians in particular are “in a privileged position as democratically legitimate exercisers of hands-off
meta-governance through a legal, political and financial framing of interactive governance processes.” [53].
When it comes to exercising hands-on meta-governance, their position is less fortunate as, e.g.,
participation may harm their independent status [59]. Nonetheless, “how politicians can exercise
meta-governance in a way that grants them both a certain level of involvement in and a fair amount of
independence from interactive governance arenas” remains a key question with regard to the role of
political leaders in processes of network governance [59].
The elaborated strategies are argued to contribute to both effectiveness and democratic legitimacy
of governance networks [44]. Network effectiveness may be enhanced by, inter alia, determining
deadlines, fostering goal alignment, providing resources to lower transaction costs and developing
trust [44]. Network democracy may be enhanced by, inter alia, assuring a broad inclusion of affected
stakeholders through network design, setting a political, financial or discursive framework through
network framing, assuring transparency through network management and enhancing a broad
policy agenda by network participation [25,44]. Figure 1 indicates several ways through which
meta-governance strategies may enhance both effectiveness and democracy of network governance
processes [44].
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Figure 1. Meta-governance and effective and democratic network governance. Derived from Sørensen
and Torfing 2009, p. 248 [44]).
3. Research Methodology
After having examined the relevant literature in the field of democratic legitimacy in governance
networks in the context of sustainability transitions, we proceed with explaining our research approach.
For this study, a qualitativ research design was chosen: the ca e study approach. Fir t, in collecting a
rich variety of data, one of the strengths of a case study approach roots in its ability to include several
sources of information on the specific case. These may involve observations, interviews, and policy
documents. Second, case studies examine the object of study in its natural context rather than an
artificial setting provided by e.g., experiments and survey research. Third, case studies have the
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ability to identify detailed social processes and causal mechanisms that underlie them. The case study
approach offers the possibility to investigate in-depth relations between a variety of variables [60,61].
Considering that this study particularly aims at getting a deep and rich understanding
of meta-governance and its influence on democratic legitimacy, the case study provides a
well-suited approach.
In doing so, we use the case of the Dutch National Agreement on Climate (“Nationaal
Klimaatakkoord”). This agreement is expected to work towards measures embodying the national-level
contribution of the Netherlands to the global objectives with regard to the reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions (GHG) as formulated in the Paris agreement on climate, signed in 2015. The Dutch national
government, however, decided to leave the exact formulation of measures up to affected stakeholders,
rather than implementing measures top down, thereby choosing to use a network governance approach.
These stakeholders constitute a governance network of private, societal, and public organizations.
The Dutch government formulated the fixed ambition of a GHG reduction of 49% by 2030. The involved
actors are expected to further negotiate the particular measures that should mount up to this ambition.
Considering the rich history of depoliticizing persistent societal issues in the Netherlands, captured
in the notion of the “Poldermodel”, this does not come as a surprise. The Poldermodel approach
assumes negotiation between mutually dependent actors to foster societal support for measures to be
implemented, as a broad representation of societal groups is included in the process of decision-making.
In terms of structure, the governance network process consists of five “sub-tables”, composed
content-wise, that are to arrive at measures mounting up to ex ante formulated objectives. These tables
and their respective objectives in terms of megatons CO2 reduction are:
• Electricity: 20.2 Mt CO2 reduction;
• Mobility: 7.3 Mt CO2 reduction;
• Industry: 14.3 Mt CO2 reduction;
• Agriculture and land use: 3.5 Mt CO2 reduction;
• Built environment: 3.4 Mt CO2 reduction.
The composition of the five sub-tables in terms of stakeholders is based on three criteria, that are
to be met in order to be invited. Actors are invited when:
• They are able to contribute concretely to the transition within their sector;
• They bring in knowledge;
• They are able to make agreements based on a mandate.
Despite these criteria, the actors involved in the actual negotiations represent public, private,
and societal groups on different levels. Examples of involved actors are NGOs such as Greenpeace,
civil organizations such as the Association for Electric Drivers, companies such as Shell, Philips,
and TataSteel, branched organizations such as LTO (‘Land- en Tuinbouworganisatie’, representing
the agricultural sector) and the association of municipalities in the Netherlands (the “Vereniging
Nederlandse Gemeenten”). The negotiations at those tables are led by an independent chair and are
administratively facilitated by civil servants from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate and
other related ministries. The overall and politically accountable authority is the minister of Economic
Affairs and Climate. The formal position of the minister, representing the executive power, also
provides the formal linkage between the two demarcated arenas: the political arena of the Dutch
parliament, and the governance arena in which the negotiating actors operate. Although opinions
conflict upon whether this governance approach is favorable in the context of national climate policy,
The Agreement on Climate thus is an important factor in the transition towards a more sustainable
society in the Netherlands.
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3.1. Research Strategy
The data for this study is acquired in various ways. Source triangulation is used twofold. On the
one hand, parliamentary documents, which are publicly accessible documents, are used to provide
insights in the actual behavior of political meta-governors. This content analysis will proceed as
follows:
• Parliamentary resolutions (In Dutch: “Moties”): Political meta-governors that are representative
within a democratic system have the ability to govern through, among others, budgeting and
regulations. These consist of proposals, captured in parliamentary resolutions, which are voted
for in parliament. Therefore, our first source consists of all parliamentary resolutions including
the terms “Klimaatakkoord” and “Klimaat-en Energieakkoord”. Here, a selection is made of those
concerning the actual “Klimaatakkoord” in the Netherlands, not to confuse with the global Paris
agreement (in Dutch also referred to as “Klimaatakkoord”). Since meta-governance concerns
attempts, resolutions that got rejected by voting are also taken into account.
• Parliamentary questions (In Dutch: “Kamervragen”): An important instrument of political
meta-governors to control the executive power consists of asking parliamentary questions.
Hence, these questions provide a crucial overview of what information is asked for by political
meta-governors, and since these documents are made public, also what is desirable to be made
transparent. In terms of democratic legitimacy, and in particular monitoring national-level climate
governance, these questions thus incorporate highly relevant information. To capture all questions
concerning the National Agreement on Climate (“Nationaal Klimaatakkoord”), the selection is
based upon the same terms as mentioned above.
All documents mentioned above will be examined by using the online archive of the Dutch house
of representatives, the “Tweede Kamer”. This can be found at www.tweedekamer.nl. The formal
starting point of the interactive governance process has been 23rd of February 2018. Since attempts to
provide a framework in advance may be at stake, all documents from the start of the parliamentary
year after the January 1st, 2018 until the execution of this study throughout June 2018, are taken
into account.
To provide in-depth insights in the information found in both resolutions and questions,
an additional source of this research will consist of interview subjects. Triangulation in terms of
interview subjects is applied as well. We used two analytical categories of interview subjects. These
are political actors and negotiating actors. This distinction is based on the respective governance
arenas in which the actors are active. Political actors operate in the institutionalized, political realm of
government, the Dutch house of representatives. Negotiating actors, on the other hand, operate in the
governance network arena concerned with the National Agreement on Climate. We set out to examine
the influence of meta-governance strategies deployed in the political arena, and how these influence
the governance network arena.
Political actors, here, represent elected officials in the Dutch parliament (“Tweede Kamer”) or
their direct policy advisors in the domain of sustainability and/or renewable energy, and therefore
affected by the National Agreement on Climate (“Nationaal Klimaatakkoord”). As this research
concerns politics, the division between right-wing and left-wing politicians may determine the
politicians’ stance towards the agreement, as it concerns a political topic. Nevertheless, the focus on the
process of governing rather than the content of the agreement is argued to cut across this traditional
divide. Particularly note that political actors are relevant when it comes to the actual application of
meta-governance strategies, and identification with the role of meta-governor.
Negotiating actors, on the other hand, are actors representing an organization in the actual
negotiations on the National Agreement on Energy and Climate and thus members of one of the
“sub-tables” as identified above.
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3.2. Operationalization
To examine political meta-governance strategies as well as the values of democratic legitimacy as
elaborated above in an appropriate manner, the operationalization of these variables is presented in
Figures 2 and 3. In literature on meta-governance, (political) meta-governance often inherently includes
democratic legitimacy [38]. However, in additional literature meta-governance is also connected to
the efficiency and effectiveness of governance networks [38]. Regarding the operationalization of
both concepts, we therefore make a clear distinction between meta-governance on the one hand and
democratic legitimacy on the other hand. This allows us to explicitly investigate the relationship
between the types of political meta-governance and forms/aspects of democratic legitimacy.
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4. Results
We set out to measure the democratic legitimacy of the governance network concerned with the
Agreement on Climate. In doing so, the following elements of democratic legitimacy were examined:
• Accountability;
• Voice;
• Due deliberation.
This section will proceed with some general observations based on the examined data and the
interviews that followed, and thereafter explicitly address the three indicators mentioned above. To
study the democratic legitimacy, particularly, the interviews with political and negotiating actors
were important.
4.1. The Democratic Legitimacy of Interactive Climate Governance in the Netherlands
Overall, the gathered data suggest a relative strong anchorage of the interactive governance
process regarding existing representative institutions. The controlling and framing powers of the
Dutch Parliament are safeguarded both in terms of input (explicitly discussing the framework for the
governance network with parliament in advance), throughput (organized interfaces throughout the
governance process) and output (the final balancing of the produced agreement and decision-making
by parliament).
Furthermore, the minister of Economic Affairs and Climate, representing the executive branch
of government, is perceived as the “accountee” on which account is to be rendered. This indeed is
in accordance with the formal division of powers, as the parliament represents the controlling and
framing power, and the minister represents the executive power. In a sense, the primacy of politics,
thus, it not explicitly challenged.
Nonetheless, the interactive approach concerning the Agreement on Climate holds implications
for the role of existing political institutions. Political actors express to feel a “threshold” to exercise their
formal power, as the governance process is expected to result in a “carefully constructed, well balanced”
agreement based on a balance between “sweet and sour” regarding the interests of all actors. Changing
things that are politically unfeasible and/or undesirable will “make this construction collapse” and may
eventually cause actors to leave the network. Political actors, hence, express their anxiety to act like a
“bull in a china shop” when they actively interfere with the carefully constructed agreements that are
presented to them.
Negotiating actors, on the other hand, do feel accountable to “come up with an agreement that is
politically feasible”, as they take into account the strong position of the parliament.
Although a certain degree of accountability towards existing political institutions is felt,
the particular concern of negotiating actors are their own constituencies.
Some of the negotiating actors explicitly address the felt “shadow or hierarchy” casted by the clear
presence of the minister of Economic Affairs and Climate. Indeed, the explicit role and “representation
of government” in the interactive governance process by civil servants cast a shadow of hierarchy, as
actors are well aware of the ability of the minister to use “law and regulations we have less influence over”
if negotiating actors “won’t arrive at the 49% goal”. This formal power of the minister is referred to as a
“stick behind the door” which actors are constantly aware of.
The transparency of the process is valued very low to zero. As an MP expresses, he “knows as
much as presented in the media”, and therefore has no more information than any other citizen. Although
some political actors perceive this as negative, there is understanding as well—an MP argues that “we
should not disturb the chicken while she’s breeding”. The final judgement which is allocated in parliament
encourages political actors to “patiently await” the result, because they know “there will be extensive
political debate” on the delivered outputs in later stages of the process.
The democratic legitimacy of interactive climate governance in the Netherlands in terms
of accountability can be valued high. This study reported high levels of accountability on the
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side of political representative institutions. Indeed, the anchorage of interactive governance in
a democratically legitimized governmental policy was shown to strengthen the role of existing
representative institutions.
Furthermore, existing structures regarding the division of accountability are not challenged, as
executive powers, in the studied case represented by the minister of Economic Affairs and Climate,
are formally accountable for the governance process. The decision of the minister to use interactive
governance as an instrument to enhance societal commitment and support, and use expertise of private,
public, and societal actors have been reported as arguments that are recognized and supported by the
Dutch Parliament. Negotiating actors do feel accountable towards public authorities, particularly to
arrive at politically feasible solutions. Accordingly, political accountability is anchored relatively strong.
Due to ex ante framework setting by means of the Coalition Agreement, making steering beforehand
and monitoring afterwards possible, a vertical accountability relationship between representative
institutions and the governance network is established.
Despite specific attempts to “strengthen the relationship between governance network and citizens” the
democratic legitimacy of interactive climate governance in the Netherlands in terms of voice can be
valued medium. Although, indeed, the reported findings suggest an interactive governance arena
in which a wide variety of substantive interests and arguments have been involved, actors needed
to adhere to formulated access criteria and proactively impose their involvement in the governance
network. This demands thought-through organization, and indeed excludes societal groups with fewer
capacity to do so. Accordingly, the direct involvement of citizens has been clearly limited. Generally,
MP’s aim at safeguarding an overall general balance between “progressive and conservative powers” in
the network rather than being concerned with the involvement of specific actors.
The democratic legitimacy of interactive climate governance in the Netherlands in terms of due
deliberation can be valued as medium. Although the public transparency of the deliberation within the
network is valued as “low to zero”, this is not perceived problematic. It is argued that, although the
transparency of the governance arena is low, it is also “as high as possible”. Both political and negotiating
actors acknowledge that a certain degree of secrecy is needed in order to negotiate properly.
The degree to which transparency was organized particularly underlines the “state-centered”
character of governance in this case, as “the degree of transparency of state-centered governance is very
much controlled by the government itself” [62]. Among others, this is shown by in-between briefings
organized by government and an in-between press release, planned in advance. These underline the
governmental influence over the degree of transparency.
4.2. The Application of Political Meta-Governance
We operationalized political leadership as political meta-governance. To identify the actual
application of political meta-governance strategies, results from both parliamentary data and
interviews with potential meta-governors are used. To recall, the meta-governance strategies that
might be exercised were identified as [45]:
• Network framing (hands-off);
• Network design (hands-off);
• Network management (hands-on);
• Network participation (hands-on).
Reflecting on political meta-governance, first and foremost, it is relevant to demarcate the
executive branch of government from the controlling branch of government, which holds executive
government to account [63]. Indeed, the Dutch Parliament concerns the controlling branch of
government, and as such, exercises democratic control. A returning feature in the research findings
reported above, is that MP’s that constitute this controlling branch perceive many of the identified
meta-governance strategies as particular roles for the executive branch of government. Accordingly,
the minister of Economic Affairs and Climate performs a considerable job as meta-governor. Since
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political meta-governance as defined in this study explicitly addresses the role of Members of
Parliament, however, we will now turn towards the role of MP’s meta-governing the interactive
climate-governance process concerning the Dutch Agreement on Climate.
There is wide consensus concerning the necessity for network governance with regard to climate
policy in the Netherlands. Both political actors and negotiating actors agree that this interactive
governance approach has significant advantages in comparison to top-down governmental policies.
Among others, these concern societal expertise (“know-how”), commitment, the organization of
societal support and, generally, smooth policy implementation in later phases. Hence, this particularly
concerns the “governability” and “instrumental” argument of interactive governance, an attempt to
“strengthen policy capacity” [18].
Indeed, the application of meta-governance strategies was shown to have come about in
the case of the Dutch Agreement on Climate. The occurrence of network framing and network
participation is considerably more often than are network design and network management. Network
framing particularly concerned discursive framing, which some political actors directly relate to their
agenda-setting role. Examples are resolutions aimed at broadening the scope of the “sub-tables”, for
instance by including emissions due to aviation and shipping (which were formerly excluded) and
the labor-related impact of the energy transition. Indeed, this has to do with the soft application of
Authority by political actors [36]. Aims to influence the “overall objective” and “joint mission” of the
governance network were explicitly reported [44]. Topics that were to be addressed concern, among
others, the size of livestock in the Netherlands, the division of societal costs brought forward by
the energy transition and reluctant, obstructing regulations that hinders companies to enhance their
sustainability performance. The setting of a framework within which actors operate can be considered
a traditional task of Dutch representative bodies, building on vertical hierarchy rather than horizontal
steering, and is accordingly referred to as “government of governance” [52]. Negotiating actors report
to be aware of this framework, and indeed have obtained a “clear idea of what the political system conceives
as politically feasible and appropriate” [44].
Network participation particularly concerned informal contacts with representatives of actors
that were involved in the network, which should not be seen separately from already established
relationships that concern lobbying in a more traditional sense. Hence, these relationships were
not specifically established to discuss and steer the particular interactive governance arena. Rather,
already established relationships were used to, next to “regular” fine-tuning and lobbying, address the
Agreement on Climate as well.
From the side of political actors, this application of network participation was particularly aimed
at “keeping up to date” of developments within the network, whereas negotiating actors used their
contacts to “explore what topics were politically feasible”, due to their awareness of the strong position
of the Dutch Parliament in the final decision-making.
Both network design and network management occurred scarcely concerning the interactive
governance process. Political actors particularly regard both strategies as part of the role performed by
the minister of Economic Affairs and Climate, representing the executive branch of government.
Nonetheless, this study reports sporadic attempts to influence the composition of the network or
the rules of the game. These concerned attempts to safeguard the particular position of certain actors,
to enhance the transparency of the governance process as such or to add actors to the governance
process. Some elected officials acknowledged that limited organizational capacity and other political
priorities played a role in their limited application of meta-governance strategies.
An overview of the applied meta-governance strategies through submitting resolutions and
asking parliamentary questions is provided in the Figures 4–7 below.
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4.3. Enhancing Democratic Legitimacy of Governance Networks in Sustainability Transitions: What Role for
Political Meta-Governance?
This study examined the democratic legitimacy of network governance in sustainability
transitions, applied on the case of the Dutch Agreement on Climate, and studied the role of political
meta-governance therein. Accordingly, the study assumed a relationship between the application of
political meta-governance and democratic legitimacy of governance networks.
In doing so, we operationalized democratic legitimacy by using a threefold conceptualization
as provided by Klijn and Edelenbos [48], further elaborated by Klijn and Koppenjan [10]. This
conceptualization consists of the elements that were comprehensively elaborated above; accountability,
voice, and due deliberation.
The second, independent variable of this study consisted of the application of political
meta-governance. Here, the application of meta-governance strategies as provided by Sørensen
and Torfing was used. This conceptualization has been elaborated above, too, and consists of network
design, network framing, network management and network participation [38,42,44].
Now let us turn towards the role of political meta-governance in safeguarding the democratic
legitimacy in our studied case. To recall, theoretically, high hopes were casted on the role of
meta-governance in enhancing democratic legitimacy [44]. Network design, for instance, is argued to
potentially safeguard the inclusion of all affected stakeholders and assure publicity concerning the
network [44]. Endeavors concerned with network framing may, among others, assure legal, financial
and discursive conditions within the operations of the network take place, and enables monitoring
and scrutinizing performance therein [44]. Network management is argued to potentially empower
weak and marginalized stakeholders and assure transparent and fair circulation of information.
In addition, network participation may arguably enhance a broad policy agenda, as the meta-governor
engages in day-to-day interaction with the network as a whole [44]. Empirically, this study showed
mixed experiences concerning the role for meta-governance in enhancing democratic legitimacy.
The preceding sections will interrelate the research findings presented above with one another in order
to provide a point of departure for general conclusions.
4.3.1. Network Design and Assuring the Inclusion of all Affected Stakeholders and Publicity
Although attempts to apply the meta-governance strategy network design were shown,
the governance network itself can be regarded as being relatively exclusive. Indeed, tangible attempts
concerning the inclusion of all affected actors (see, e.g., the resolution to include the financial sector
and environmental organizations) occurred. Notwithstanding the importance of these attempts,
administrative rules concerning the general accessibility of the governance network were applied
strictly, demanding negotiating actors to proactively self-organize and impose their presence in the
network and resulting in the exclusion of specific societal groups (e.g., fishermen and citizens opposing
wind farms were mentioned). A dilemma put forward, here, is that most political and negotiating
actors consider the network as being relatively inclusive and generally well balanced. To recall the
expression of a policy advisor, he “wouldn’t know how to do it better”, as there is no “scientifically perfect
balance” of whom to include. When holding on to the theoretical conceptualization of voice, however,
rules regarding access indicate privileged access, and therefore relative exclusiveness [48,57].
Attempts to apply network design to assure publicity of the network were shown as well, for
instance by assuring interfaces with Parliament in advance, and calling upon the executive branch
of government to proceed the negotiation in public. However, both political actors and negotiating
actors value the transparency of the governance network as “low to zero”, but simultaneously “as
high as possible”, as they both acknowledge that “negotiating in the public is impossible”. Accordingly,
the application of network design was shown to occur but did not cause significant differences
concerning the inclusiveness nor the publicity of the governance network.
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4.3.2. Network Framing and Assuring and Monitoring a Framework for Network Governance
Application of the network framing strategy was reported manifold, as elected officials used their
position to provide a framework for network governance to be organized. In particular, discursive
framing occurred. Nonetheless, the framework, in this case incorporated in the politically endorsed
Coalition Agreement, causes actors to be well aware of the strong position of the Dutch Parliament and
positively contribute to a formal basis to render account on. Accordingly, this can mainly be regarded
as positively influencing the democratic value of accountability, particularly strengthening the existing
accountability relationship between the controlling and executive branches of government [63].
4.3.3. Network Management and Empowering Weaker Stakeholders
The application of network management as hands-on meta-governance strategy was not reported
extensively. Indeed, political actors particularly regard the activities related to network management
as tasks for executive government and public administrators [63]. What is more, is that actors that
can be considered in a relatively weak (e.g., Greenpeace) position in comparison to private actors put
forward that they “would not accept support from government”, even if they were offered. Accordingly,
no correlation between network management by elected officials and values of democratic legitimacy
could be discovered.
4.3.4. Network Participation and Enhancing a Broad Policy Agenda
Although Sørensen defines network participation as direct participation, this study reported more
indirect ways of network participation. MP’s report to, indeed, engage in direct interaction with
negotiating actors. However, they do so in the “regular” realms of the Dutch political arena, implicitly
indicating they are reluctant to participate in the studied interactive governance arena itself. Although
influencing the policy agenda through network participation was mentioned, network participation
was shown to be particularly aimed at exchanging information. Indeed, a reciprocal relationship
between political and negotiating actors was reported. Political actors used their interaction with
actors to obtain information regarding the ongoing negotiations and to address topics they were
concerned with, whereas negotiating actors used their interaction to explore the political feasibility
and appropriateness of specific measurements and proposals (compare with network framing in
Sørensen [26]). Arguably, these pathways of direct communication between political and negotiating
actors will “provide valuable inputs to the formulation of new and adequate solutions” and “a
strong commitment of the political community” to realize the negotiated policies and secure goal
achievement [42].
5. Conclusions and Discussion
In this article, we set out to address the manifestation of political leadership as meta-governance,
and what consequences this has for democratic legitimacy of network governance in sustainability
transitions. We therefore studied a case of national-level interactive climate governance, provided by
the Dutch Agreement on Climate (“Nationaal Klimaatakkoord”). Before we present our conclusions,
we would first like to address the limitations of our study. First, we have conducted a single case
study research which allowed us to do in-depth analysis, but at same time limits us in generalizing
our findings and projecting these to countries other than the Netherlands. Furthermore, the particular
tradition of interactive climate governance in the Netherlands, as well as the relatively strong nature
and position of societal actors, should be taken into account. Moreover, time has been a serious
limitation, as the governance process subject to this research was running simultaneously to the process
of data gathering. Indeed, no final policy outcomes are to be reported, and consequently, the legitimacy
of those outcomes could only be estimated to a limited extent, partly based on expectations of
interviewees and the announced process. Despite these limitations we believe we still can draw
meaningful conclusions.
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A first conclusion from the case analysis of the Dutch Agreement on Climate underlines the
development is that government officials are increasingly seeking to solve complex problems through
“interactive forms of governance”, such as governance networks [42]. In addition, the state-centered
character of the analyzed case on the national agreement on climate shows that state actors retain to
play a “pivotal role”, even in cases of more horizontality among actors in interactive governance [18].
Accordingly, participating actors indicated to be aware of the close presence and potential interference
of governmental actors, illustrating a “shadow of hierarchy” [39,64].
A second conclusion that can be drawn from our case study is that political leaders do not have
the full capacities and are not really prepared to perform the roles of meta-governance. We identified
that political leaders were able to perform some meta-governance strategies, i.e., network framing and
participation, but were not able to encompass all four available strategies, including network design
and management. This is in line with previous literature stressing that the role of meta-governance
is challenging, and that people need the right capacities to apply fully-fledged meta-governance
strategies [52]. This conclusion falls apart in the following arguments. First, Torfing et al. put forward
that “the effective and efficient exercise of meta-governance calls for a mix of the different forms” thereof. This
study reported the application of disparate meta-governance strategies but does not illustrate such
a mixed approach towards complementing hands-off strategies with hands-on strategies and vice
versa. Second, the limited application of political meta-governance partly roots in leaving the lions”
share of meta-governance strategies to the executive branch of government and public administrators,
due to the general conception that these, in particular network design and network management, are
administrative roles. Although the role image of political meta-governors was not widely recognized
in the studied case, some politicians did take a proactive stance in applying two meta-governance
strategies in particular: network framing and network participation. Nonetheless, a deliberate,
integrative, and fully-fledged approach towards meta-governing the Dutch Agreement on Climate,
covering all different elements of meta-governance as such, did not come about. Barriers concerning the
application of political meta-governance by elected officials have been reported manifold, and concern
among others:
• Narrow interpretation of meta-governance [44];
• Limited resources [52];
• Political role conflicts [51];
• Democratic tradition and institutions [58].
As can be drawn from the case of the Dutch Agreement on Climate, this study adds to
those obstacles:
• Limited time and organizational capacity to meta-govern (compare Vabo & Røiseland [36]);
• Political priorities concerning the substantive issues that are to be meta-governed.
A third conclusion is that the strong anchorage of interactive governance processes in a broader,
politically endorsed governance framework safeguards both democratic accountability and in turn
strengthens the ability of political leaders to apply network framing strategies [44]. This conclusion
can be explained in two ways: The state-centered character of interactive governance portrayed in this
case, being the result of anchoring network governance in governmental policy, safeguards traditional
mechanisms of vertical political accountability [10]. Consequently, there is a common sense regarding
who is accountable to whom. That is, the minister of Economic Affairs and Climate, representing
the executive branch of government, is accountable towards the Dutch Parliament, representing the
controlling branch of government. The politically endorsed Coalition Agreement is the formulated
basis over which account is rendered. Both in terms of input (determining the framework) and output
(final decision-making), hence, the representative position of the Dutch Parliament is safeguarded.
In doing so, perhaps the most controversial dimension of governance through governance networks,
decision-making by societal actors, is mediated. The ability of politicians to apply network framing
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has been partly fostered by anchorage of network governance in broader governmental policy as well.
Here, again, this framework-setting role is not considerably different from the traditional position of
representative bodies in the Netherlands [52].
Consequently, this is likely to be regarded as the “government of governance” rather than
“governance of governance”. The case shows that network framing was shown to be particularly
discursive. Indeed, politicians associated discursive network framing with their more traditional
agenda-setting role. The broader governance framework provided by the Coalition Agreement has
been extensively debated in the Dutch parliamentarian arena, and hence provided space for network
framing within the traditional realm of politics. As reported, both formal means in the political arena,
such as parliamentary resolutions and questions, as well as informal means, such as informal contacts
with actors, were used to this end.
The findings of this study underline that, although some meta-governance strategies do come
about, the exercise of meta-governance is generally regarded as a mere task for executive government
rather than elected officials. In doing so, the Netherlands appear somewhat comparable with
Canada, as both countries show that state-directed administrative meta-governance is dominant [25].
Indeed, this may hold severe implications for democratic legitimacy and the position of elected
officials [63]. Accordingly, the pathway towards lasting role innovation concerning the role of elected
representatives, has again been shown to be a long and bumpy one. Although the emphasis on
elected officials as political meta-governors is arguably a justified one, this study reported a high
relevance for administrative meta-governance. Although one may argue that, indeed, the executive
branch of government is controlled by elected officials, the tendency to leave meta-governance a mere
administrative task comes at a severe risk of damaging democratic values [63]. Nonetheless, based
on this study, the divide between political and administrative meta-governance might be considered
a redundant one. Accordingly, future research might consider defining political meta-governance
broader—that is, including administrative meta-governance.
A fourth conclusion is that, although political accountability is anchored very well, critical
remarks can be made concerning the societal and public accountability of the governance network [10].
Although this fits the representative model of democracy very well, in which elected officials are held
accountable using political mechanisms of accountability, accountability as elaborated in associative
and deliberative models of democracy tends to be underexposed. Indeed, this stresses the importance
of the governance network to encounter the broader citizenry [49].
A fifth conclusion that may be drawn from this case study is that values other than democratic
accountability, i.e., voice and due deliberation, perform relatively poor in state-centered interactive
governance. The focus of political leadership is securing accountability, which goes as the expense
of democratic values of voice and deliberation. This particularly relates to two renowned dilemmas
regarding network governance. The first dilemma, relating to voice, explicitly addresses the tension
between effectiveness and inclusiveness [14]. As they put forward, “the more that organizational
participants are involved in the network decision process, the more time consuming and resource intensive
that process will tend to be”. As the governance process examined in the case of the Dutch Agreement
on Climate is confronted with a particular timeframe, choices regarding its composition are made.
This, indeed, resulted in the explicit exclusion of particular actors. Generally, this encountered
understanding among both political actors and negotiating actors, as long as a certain substantive
balance of interests was safeguarded. The second dilemma, relating to due deliberation, has been
identified by Torfing et al. and concerns the tension between secluded and transparent governance [62].
As the case of the Dutch National Agreement on Climate shows, this continues to pose dilemmas
regarding the degree of transparency that is to be included.
We then would like to conclude with some final words. This study indicated the retaining
importance of state actors in network governance in sustainability transitions. The findings of this
study, on the other hand, suggest a clearly limited role for political meta-governance in enhancing
the democratic performance of governance networks. Consequently, further research into the role of
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political meta-governance in relation to democratic legitimacy is needed. Directions aimed at building
forward on the findings reported in this study may aim to examine, among others:
• The democratic legitimacy of administrative meta-governance rather than political
meta-governance, and consequences of interactive governance regarding the traditional divide
between controlling and executive branches of government;
• The application of meta-governance in (in contrast to national-level) local governance concerned
with sustainability transitions on decentered levels of government;
• The democratic legitimacy of sustainability transitions in terms of democratic values other
than accountability, due deliberation, and voice, with less emphasis on representative models
of democracy;
• The deliberate application of meta-governance strategies by state-centered administrative actors
and civil servants, particularly aimed at democratic legitimacy;
• Success factors relating to role innovation of political meta-governors.
It is clear that the current and future importance of sustainability transitions on all levels of
government calls for closely studying the way these may best be governed. As this study showed,
it is not only problematic for sustainability transitions to overcome particular obstacles concerning
their effective implementation, but also concerning their democratic legitimacy. Despite the clear
presence of actor–network logic, the political character of sustainability transitions calls for research in
sustainability transitions to be well aware of not downplaying the importance of political leadership
and the role of elected officials therein. Hence, we call upon future research to closely scrutinize
the way sustainability transitions are to be governed when simultaneously accelerating their speed
and safeguarding their democratic legitimacy, and what role lies ahead for new forms of political
leadership therein.
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